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ABSTRACT:  Crime risk perception is known to be an important determinant of 
individual well-being. It is therefore crucial that we understand the factors affecting this 
perception so that governments can identify the (public) policies that might reduce it. 
Among such policies, public resources devoted to policing emerge as a key instrument 
not only for tackling criminal activity but also for impacting on citizens’ crime risk 
perception. In this framework, the aim of this study is to analyze both the individual and 
neighbourhood determinants of citizens’ crime risk perception in the City of Barcelona 
(Spain) focusing on the effect of police proximity and taking into account the spatial 
aspects of neighbourhood characteristics. After controlling for the possible problems of 
the endogeneity of police forces and crime risk perception and the potential sorting of 
individuals across neighbourhoods, the results indicate that crime risk perception is 
reduced when non-victims exogenously interact with police forces. Moreover, 
neighbourhood variables, such as proxies of social capital and the level of incivilities, 
together with individual characteristics have an impact on citizens’ crime risk perception.   
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1. Introduction 
Crime is a major concern for both individuals and governments in many countries. Its 
negative effects on people’s well-being as well as its direct economic and social costs 
justify devoting large quantities of public resources to its prevention and control. 
From an individual standpoint, crime affects the well-being of those that directly suffer 
criminal activity and, more generally, of all citizens through the insecurity it creates.1 At an 
aggregate level, governments dedicate a sizeable share of public resources to crime 
prevention and control. A wide range of policies are employed to reduce criminal attitudes 
and here police forces are the main tool used. Proximity or community policing is 
frequently the strategy adopted to reduce insecurity.2 In the US, the Community Oriented 
Policing Services (COPS) Office3 recognizes that people need not only to be safe, but to 
feel safe. As Cordner (2010) points out, “treating both of these issues [to be safe and to 
feel safe] as two parts of a greater whole is a critical aspect of community policing”. 
In this paper we estimate the main individual and neighbourhood determinants of 
citizen insecurity in the City of Barcelona (Spain)4 by using a multilevel ordered logit 
model and a unique individual victimization survey for the period 2008 - 2010. By drawing 
on such a rich dataset for an urban setting5 we are able to address various issues, including 
a number of new questions, regarding crime risk perception and so contribute substantially 
to the existing literature. First, we report new evidence about individual and 
neighbourhood determinants of perceived insecurity (measured as crime risk perception). 
                                                                 
1
 Citizen insecurity is a common concern. For instance, in Latin America and the Caribbean, one of the 
regions with the highest homicide rates in the world, feelings of insecurity in the region are widespread (see 
Latinobarometro, 2009:77) and studies from the Inter-American Development Bank show that around 60% of 
the population report not feeling safe in their neighbourhoods. In a European country such as Spain, with 
much lower crime rates, the Centre of Sociological Research reported that citizen insecurity, between 2006 
and 2008, was among the three main concerns of almost one in every five Spaniards (note that, in this case, 
citizen insecurity does not include concerns about terrorism). 
2
 Proximity units comprise police officers that work in the community with citizens. The officers, who 
typically patrol on motorbike or on foot, are therefore more visible and are able to establish contact with 
citizens, associations and neighbours in order to learn about their main problems and needs on matters of 
security. 
3
 http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/ 
4
 The City of Barcelona is a large, highly populated, modern, tourist city where petty crime rates are on the 
increase. Newspapers tend to focus increasingly on the impact of pick-pocketing and burglaries on crime risk 
perception; see for instance La Vanguardia (2012); 
http://www.lavanguardia.com/sucesos/20121129/54355929103/consecuencias-psicologicas-robos-
domicilios.html. 
5
 Note that the literature on crime acknowledges that the urban setting is the optimal environment in which to 
analyze the determinants and impact of criminal behaviour. For instance, cities present higher crime rates 
than rural areas and, moreover, in urban settings social interactions (crucial nowadays to our understanding 
of criminal behaviour) are more prevalent (Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999). 
2
  
Second, we examine the effect of police proximity on people’s crime risk perception, 
controlling for the spatial effects of citizen evaluation of police performance as well as 
other neighbourhood characteristics. Third, we are able to overcome two important 
identification problems; on the one hand the likely problem of endogeneity between police 
proximity and the individual level of insecurity by means of exogenous source of 
interaction between these two variables, and on the other hand the likely problem of the 
endogenous sorting of individuals across neighbourhoods by means of a subsample of the 
surveyed individuals. 
Our main finding is that the simple fact of being stopped by a police officer (in a traffic 
control) to be a signal of police proximity lowers the level of crime risk perception, albeit 
only for those individuals that had not recently suffered victimization. Hence, we find a 
positive causal relation between police forces and individual security feelings. These 
results add to the empirical literature concerned with understanding the impact of the 
police on crime (Corman and Mocan, 2000; Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2004; Draca et al., 
2010; Evans and Owens, 2007; Klick and Tabarrok, 2005; Levitt, 2002; McCrary, 2002) 
and on citizens’ insecurity (Della-Giustina and Silverman, 2001; Ferguson and Mindel, 
2006; Groff et al., 2013; Moore and Trojanowicz, 1988; Pate et al. 1987; Trojanowicz, 
1982). This literature had not produced clear cut results in part due to the difficulty and 
methodological challenges faced when trying to establish causal relations between these 
variables.6 A shortcoming we rectify here. 
Moreover, the need still exists to obtain a better understanding of the determinants of 
individual crime risk perception, especially as to how individual and neighbourhood 
characteristics interact in shaping people’s insecurity. Such an analysis should help in the 
design of preventive public policies that can be effective in reducing crime risk perception. 
There is also a need to evaluate the impact of police on reducing crime risk perception as 
this should provide essential insights as to the effectiveness of public resources devoted to 
security issues, at least as regards those aimed at increasing individual well-being and, 
hence, the overall well-being of society. 
In short, in the light of the existing literature, given the importance of the analysis of 
the determinants of crime risk perception, and the debate on the effectiveness of police 
measures to reduce this perception, here we focus on the individual and neighbourhood 
                                                                 
6
 For instance, as police resources may be allocated geographically according to the level of criminal activity 
across an area, results would tend to indicate that a greater number of police officers increase criminal 
activity, unless police intervention is random and exogenous. 
3
  
determinants of crime risk perception paying special attention to the impact of police 
proximity. This analysis is novel not only for Spain but also for the European case, and 
serves to contrast the results obtained here with those in the broader literature focused 
mainly on the US case.7 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the 
institutional setting. Section 3 presents our empirical approach and the potential estimation 
problems. Section 4 presents the results obtained. Finally, section 5 summarizes the main 
conclusions of the study. 
 
2. Data Description and Institutional Details 
2.1 The City of Barcelona 
Barcelona is one of Spain’s largest cities with a population in 2011 of over 1.5 million 
inhabitants. It lies in the Autonomous Community of Catalonia, on the north-east coast of 
Spain, and is one of the country’s leading tourist destinations and a magnet of economic 
activity. This modern, open, international city is organized in 38 neighbourhoods and 10 
districts, over which four police forces have jurisdiction.8 Spain’s process of 
decentralization granted Catalonia its own police force, the Mossos d’Esquadra, which 
plays the leading role in the region’s security. In addition, Barcelona operates a local police 
force, the Guardia Urbana, which is also responsible for security at the city level. The 
main Spanish State police forces, the Cuerpo Nacional de Policia and the Guardia Civil, 
have retained some competences in Barcelona following the deployment of the 
autonomous police in 2005, including administrative duties (issuing of ID/passports and 
immigration documentation) and the fight against terrorism and other specific crimes (drug 
trafficking, organized crime, etc.). Here, we examine the impact of both the local and the 
                                                                 
7
 In particular, quantitative studies linking crime, crime risk perception and police forces are scarce for the 
European case. The British case has been examined drawing on the well-known British Crime Survey (Gray 
et al. 2008). Other studies include one conducted for Greece by Tseloni and Zarafonitou (2008), while for 
Spain the only analysis relating fear of crime and police interventions is that undertaken by Medina (2003) 
who shows that the so-called Belloch Plan (named after the head of the Spanish Home Office, the socialist 
Juan Alberto Belloch (1994-1996), involved increasing the number of police officers in Spain’s main cities in 
1995 in order to increase public safety, reduce the fear of crime and cut the response time to emergency calls) 
did not have any impact on people’s fear of crime but it did have an effect on people’s perception of the 
police. 
8
 A fifth police force, the “Harbour Police”, does operate but it only has jurisdiction over the traffic within 
the city’s harbour and, as such, has no impact on common crime typologies such as property crimes or crimes 
against the person. 
4
  
regional police forces (Guardia Urbana and Mossos d’Esquadra) on crime risk perception 
given that they are known to be the closest to the citizens.9 
 
 
2.2 Individual Survey Data 
We use individual level data from the Barcelona public security survey, a victimization 
survey carried out annually by the City Council.10 The survey was first carried out in 1984 
and it consists of between 4,500 and 6,000 phone interviews conducted each year with 
Barcelona residents across the 38 neighbourhoods. The survey explores victimization 
experiences and gathers information about the respondents’ socio-economic and personal 
characteristics. Importantly, its sampling methods are representative at the neighbourhood 
level. The survey is divided in three parts: the first collects the respondents’ personal 
information; the second enquires about the possible victimization of individuals and 
gathers detailed information about criminal acts they have suffered; the third (which is 
carried out with just 50% of those surveyed) records opinions about the police forces and 
safety issues. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics. 
Individual/Neighbourhood variables Obs. Mean Standard Dev. Min. Max. 
crime_risk_perception 11,608 1.68 0.98 0 4 
police_call 11,608 0.22 0.41 0 1 
police_stop 11,608 0.14 0.35 0 1 
age 11,608 46.19 17.85 16 95 
gender 11,608 0.51 0.50 0 1 
victim_property 11,608 0.35 0.48 0 1 
victim_person 11,608 0.06 0.24 0 1 
foreign_born 11,608 0.09 0.28 0 1 
education 11,608 4.14 1.47 1 9 
N_crime_rate 11,608 0.38 0.13 0.19 0.89 
N_incivilities 11,608 5.79 0.63 3.96 6.79 
N_male_immigrant 11,608 3.46 1.89 1.71 10.73 
N_youth_male 11,608 9.67 1.41 7.33 17.29 
N_average_income 11,608 3.01 0.07 2.64 3.17 
N_education 11,608 3.95 0.46 3.09 4.83 
N_election_partc 11,608 51.87 5.49 32.87 60.91 
N_police_perception 11,608 5.68 0.19 5.34 6.29 
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 In the case of Catalonia one of the main goals of the regional police (Mossos d’Esquadra) is to reduce 
citizen insecurity and, so, many police officers patrol the streets not only to prevent crime but also to make 
citizens feel safer. 
10
 Table 1 presents the basic descriptive statistics of the variables described in this section and used in the 
empirical estimations. 
5
  
In this study, we use data for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010,11 giving a total number 
of, after removing missing values, 11,608 individuals.12 The survey is not conceived as a 
panel since respondents change from one year to the next. Therefore, in order to take 
advantage of all the data available, we construct a pooled cross-sectional database for the 
three years of study including all the variables of interest. 
Dependent variable 
Our main dependent variable, “crime_risk_perception” is based on the following 
survey question: “Assess from 0 to 4 the level of insecurity in your neighbourhood where 0 
means very unsafe and 4 means very safe”.13 This measure of insecurity can be considered 
as being close to the concept of crime risk perception as it assesses the cognitive 
component of perception more than it does its emotional component. Therefore, henceforth 
we refer to our dependent variable as individual crime risk perception. Note to facilitate the 
interpretation of the empirical results we reverse the valuation of the response (with 0 
being very secure and 4 very insecure). According to Map 1 in Figure 1a some 
neighbourhoods present a high number of respondents with high levels of crime risk 
perception especially in the north-east and south-west of the city, corresponding to 
neighbourhoods that present specific socio-economic characteristics, as we see below. 
Individual exposure to police forces 
The survey offers two possible approximations for our variable of interest, that is, a 
measure of police proximity. These two variables are “police_call” and “police_stop”. The 
first variable is a dichotomous variable taking a value of 1 if there has been contact 
between the individual and the police either by telephone (a request for help, a complaint 
or a request for information) or in person (reporting crimes to the police) and 0 otherwise. 
Note, however, that this variable can suffer from reverse causality given that an 
individual’s level of risk perception can determine their propensity to contact the police. 
To overcome this problem, we employ an exogenous (to the individual crime risk 
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 We choose this sample period as the data for earlier years presented problems of homogeneity for the time 
span of the main variables of interest, which could affect the interpretation of our results.  
12
 Missing values represent around 2,000 observations; however, this does not constitute a risk of sample 
selection bias given that the deleted individuals do not systematically present a tendency not to respond to a 
certain type of question. 
13
 From the outset it is essential we clarify what we understand by the main concept addressed in this study, 
namely, citizen insecurity. Insecurity, in the broad and interdisciplinary literature dealing with it, is given a 
wide range of interpretations, but typically two related concepts are distinguished: fear of crime and crime 
risk perception. LaGrange and Ferraro (1987) suggest that the former can be conceived as the emotional or 
affective component of perception, while the latter is the cognitive component of perception. However, as 
further suggested by LaGrange et al. (1992) perceived risk mediates the effect on emotionally generated fear. 
In other words, the greater the individual’s crime risk perception, the greater is their fear of crime. This is 
confirmed by Wilcox and Land (1996) who report considerable alignments between these two concepts. 
6
  
perception) variable that is indicative of police proximity. In this case, “police_stop” is 
also a dichotomous variable taking a value of 1 if someone has been stopped by a police 
officer and 0 otherwise. In our survey, we select those individuals that have been stopped 
because of an alcohol/drug test when driving or in routine traffic controls (documentation). 
We consider this variable as exogenous because police stop citizens independently of their 
individual crime risk perception, while the location of police officers when stopping 
individuals for car/documentation controls is also exogenous to the neighbourhood crime 
level, given that some of these controls are performed outside the City of Barcelona. 
Consequently, by using this variable our estimations of police-citizen contact can be seen 
as being causal and not as being driven by reverse causality issues.14 
In our sample 21.2% of the respondents reported having had contact with the police 
(“police_call”) and 16.24% had been stopped (“police_stop”). Maps 3 and 4 (in Figure 1a) 
present the distribution of these variables across the neighbourhoods. As expected the 
spatial distribution of the “police_call” variable resembles closely the distribution of the 
victimization index (see Map 2 in Figure 1a) and this should also determine a higher 
presence of police officers in these neighbourhoods. Note, however, that given its nature, 
the spatial distribution of the “police_stop” variable does not appear to be related to the 
victimization index. Therefore, we employ this “exogeneity” to identify the impact of 
police contact on crime risk perception. 
The expected results of the impact of citizen-police contact on individual crime risk 
perception could, in principle, be either positive or negative. A negative impact (a positive 
sign in our multilevel ordered logit model) would imply that someone that has been 
stopped by the police is more likely to report lower levels of crime risk perception than 
someone who has not (a greater sense of protection). By contrast, a positive impact might 
also occur if an individual’s crime risk perception is increased after their being stopped (a 
greater sense of danger). Indeed, Braga (2001) and Hinkle and Weisburd (2008) report that 
those living in neighbourhoods where police crackdowns are frequent, despite the 
reduction in crime, may suffer an increase in their levels of crime risk perception. 
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 See section 3.1 for more details on the exogeneity of the variable “police_stop” with respect to the 
individual crime risk perception. 
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Figure 1a: Maps for main variables of interest across the 38 Barcelona 
neighbourhoods 
Map 1: Crime risk perception Map 2: Distribution of victimization index  
  
Map 3: Police_call Map 4: Police_stop 
  
 
Other individual explanatory variables 
Moreover, we include several variables that may affect people’s crime risk perception. 
First, we account for an individual’s physical and social vulnerability by including a 
dummy variable (“gender”) that takes a value of 1 if the individual is a woman and 0 
otherwise. We also include the age of the individual (“age”) since, like women (Ferraro, 
1996), the elderly are also expected to present less physical strength and competence 
(Clemente and Kleiman, 1977) and, hence, a higher crime risk perception.15 
The literature has also identified a strong relationship between crime risk perception 
and prior direct or indirect (knowing a victim) victimization (Ho and McKean, 2004; 
Mesch, 2001; Rountree and Land, 1996; Skogan, 1986; Tseloni and Zarafonitou, 2008). 
This relationship has been found to be both positive and negative. In the former case, being 
victimized eliminates people’s belief of their being invulnerable to negative events and of 
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 Rountree and Land (1996) showed that this result may be reversed if instead of crime risk perception a 
study uses the emotional fear of crime as its dependent variable. 
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their living in a substantially benevolent and meaningful world (Janoff-Bulman, 1989). In 
the latter case, Hill et al. (1985) and McGarrell et al. (1997) report that previous 
victimization might lead some individuals to believe that they are at greater risk of future 
victimization, but those who have experienced prior victimization might also avoid certain 
areas or people they deem dangerous, thereby reducing their perceived vulnerability and 
fear. An alternative explanation is that individuals who were previously victimized may 
consider that the odds of their suffering another crime are now quite low. As such, they 
might present lower levels of crime risk perception. 
 
Figure 1b: Maps for main variables of interest across the 38 Barcelona neighbourhoods 
(cont) 
Map 5: Distribution of male immigrants Map 6: Distribution of educational level 
  
Map 7: Distribution of perceived incivilities Map 8: Distribution of electoral participation 
  
 
In our empirical model we include the variables “victim_property” and 
“victim_person” to account for prior victimization related to crimes against property or 
crimes involving interpersonal violence, albeit with a number of restrictions. First, the 
variables account solely for direct victimization, since no questions are asked about 
relatives/friends’ victimization and, second, the survey enquires solely about victimization 
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experiences during the previous year. It should be pointed out that prior victimization may 
not be correlated with crime risk perception if unobservable characteristics of individuals 
are not taken into account (Maris and Ortega, 2013). However, as the authors point out, 
using pooled cross sections can overcome this issue. Map 2 (in Figure 1a) plots the overall 
victimization index and shows that the spatial distribution does not necessarily coincide 
with that of crime risk perception. 
We include the variable “foreign_born” which takes a value of 1 if the individual is 
foreign born and 0 otherwise. By adding this variable we seek to account for the effect of 
immigration on crime risk perception (Map 5 in Figure 1b presents the distribution of male 
immigrants across the 38 Barcelona neighbourhoods). Foreign born individuals may 
present a different level of crime risk perception if, for instance, in their countries of origin 
crime and violence are more common events or even if such events are perceived 
differently from a social perspective. 
We also include the individual level of education. The variable “education”, plotted in 
Map 6 in Figure 1b, may influence the levels of crime and, therefore, the levels of crime 
risk perception. By including this variable we measure both the income level of each 
individual (given the correlation between income and education) and, also, the general 
level of knowledge that individuals possess. It seems reasonable to assume that the more 
educated perceive reality clearer as their sources of information tend to be broader. 
Similarly, they tend to socialize more (Lochner and Moretti, 2007) and read the press more 
frequently, which suggest that information concerning the reality of their neighbourhood is 
likely to be obtained almost instantly and in a clear fashion. This variable ranges from 1 if 
individuals have received fewer than five years of education (primary school completed) 
up to 9 if they have a university degree. 
 
 
2.3 Neighbourhood Data and Variables16 
As discussed above, we also conduct our estimates taking into account neighbourhood 
characteristics as possible determinants of crime risk perception in a multilevel framework. 
Our neighbourhood data are taken from the official statistics published by the Barcelona 
City Council. Given that we use data for three years at the individual level, we need to 
homogenize the yearly neighbourhood data. We do this simply by taking the average of 
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 To distinguish these from individual variables, we refer to the neighbourhood variables as 
“N_namevariable”. 
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each variable for each neighbourhood over the three-year period of study. By doing this, 
we cancel out any yearly fluctuations (white noise) in the neighbourhood variables 
(Hoogue et al., 2011). Hence, we implicitly assume a certain stability in the 
neighbourhoods’ characteristics. 
In the case of data being unavailable from the Barcelona City Council’s Statistics 
Department, we draw on information from the survey clustered at the neighbourhood level. 
We include the victimization index of each neighbourhood “N_crime_rate” to account for 
the effect of the total neighbourhood victimization crime rate on individual crime risk 
perception (Roundtree and Land, 1996). Moreover, the “broken window” thesis claims that 
incivilities or minor disorders are likely to influence a chain of events that will affect crime 
risk perception.17 To test this, we include the level of perceived incivilities at the 
neighbourhood level calculated as the average of the perceived incivilities for all the 
individuals belonging to a certain neighbourhood, “N_incivilities”, in order to approximate 
these minor disorders. This variable is defined from 0, many incivilities perceived in the 
neighbourhood, to 10, no incivilities perceived (see Map 7 in Figure 1b). 
The neighbourhood composition may also affect people’s crime risk perception since 
those living in neighbourhoods with a large influx of immigrant population may perceive 
this as “an invasion” by different racial and ethnic groups (Skogan, 1995). If the local 
population are prejudiced towards immigrants and hold them responsible for increased 
crime rates,18 seeing immigrants around the neighbourhood might be interpreted as a sign 
of their being at a greater risk of falling victim to crime. For this reason, we include the 
variable “N_male_immigrant”, defined as the proportion of male immigrants in each 
neighbourhood. Similarly, we also control for the number of male youths “N_youth_male” 
since, as Buonanno and Montolio (2009) point out for the Spanish case, young people are 
more likely to engage in criminal activities. Socio-economic status is also one of the main 
determinants of crime risk perception (Wyant, 2008) and, here, we employ the average 
income “N_average_income” of individuals in each neighbourhood to obtain an 
approximation of this status. 
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 The “broken window” thesis (Wilson and Kelling, 1982) holds that personal and neighbourhood 
characteristics can account for the fear of crime and even for crime itself. The thesis draws links between 
three important neighbourhood concepts, namely, disorder, fear and crime. Thus, a minor disorder such as a 
broken window, if left unchecked, will generate the perception that no one cares about it, generating 
increasing levels of fear. Levels of distrust among the neighbours rise and they start to behave differently - 
staying at home more and socializing less with each other. In turn, this leads to a reduction in natural 
surveillance permitting further disorder and minor crimes. 
18
 The 2008 European Social Survey revealed that almost 40% of Spanish citizens surveyed agreed or 
strongly agreed that “immigrants make the country a worse place to live in”. 
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Following Lochner and Moretti (2007), who find that education increases opportunities 
of obtaining legitimate rents from the legal labour market, which implies that education 
may negatively affect both property and violent crime and, consequently, lead to an overall 
reduction in the crime risk perception, we introduce the average level of education in the 
neighbourhood “N_education”. 
We also consider a proxy for the level of social capital in the neighbourhood since 
community values, relationships between individuals and involvement in public affairs 
may create a sense of community trust and union. We include an approximation of the 
neighbourhood level of social capital, “N_election_partc”, which is the voter turnout at the 
2006 local elections (see Map 8 in Figure 1b). In this regard, social capital is seen as an 
increasing function of participation in civic life, and voter turnout has been used broadly as 
an approximation of social capital since it is hypothesized to capture civic involvement and 
participation in community decision making. Again, the larger this share, the greater the 
implication of individuals in public affairs and, therefore, we would expect a negative 
effect on crime risk perception. 
Finally, we also control for the average perception of the work done by the police as 
revealed by the individuals surveyed in each neighbourhood. This variable, 
“N_police_perception”, takes a value from 0 (highly unfavourable view of police forces) to 
10 (the highest assessment of their work). A priori, we expect that the better the outcomes 
of police officers in solving neighbourhood crime, the higher the assessment given by 
individuals. 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
3.1 Endogeneity Issues of Crime Risk Perception and Police Contact 
Our empirical approach is parsimonious and we begin by running a multilevel 
cumulative logit model (see Appendix A for technical details) in which individual and 
neighbourhood level control variables are introduced.19 Our variables of interest can then 
be added. First, we include the “police_call” variable which, as explained, is potentially 
endogenous, that is, its estimated coefficient may be biased because individuals who 
present a higher crime risk perception are more likely to contact the police when they 
witness something suspicious. For instance, someone with a high crime risk perception that 
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 As a robustness test regarding the empirical model estimated, we provide in the Appendix B the (main) 
results using an ordered logit model (instead of our multilevel strategy) with neighbourhood and year fixed 
effects. In general, we qualitatively obtain the same results as those presented in the following sections. 
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sees a group of youths in the park at night may call the police because she believes they are 
likely to cause trouble (get into fights, consume drugs, vandalise public facilities, etc.). As 
such, police contact may reflect a positive impact on crime risk perception. 
Therefore, the key concern in our estimates is that we address the causal effects of 
policing on individual crime risk perception properly. We deal with this endogeneity issue 
by using the alternative measure of police contact, the “police_stop” variable, which takes 
into account citizen-police contact when the former are stopped by the police. As 
previously explained this is, a priori, an exogenous measure since police traffic controls 
typically stop citizens “at random”.20 Given the importance of this aspect to our 
estimations, we devote some efforts to proving this point in greater detail by regressing the 
individual crime risk perception on the probability of being pulled over at a police traffic 
control point (“police_stop”) using a Probit model. The non significance of our crime risk 
perception variable would indicate the exogeneity of this police variable (see Table 2). 
However, as discussed in Cornaglia and Leigh (2011), an important issue to account 
for is the distinction between victims and non-victims, since previous victimization 
experiences may bias the relation between the “police_stop” variable and an individual’s 
crime risk perception. More precisely, we expect police encounters to have a different 
effect on victims and non-victims given their previous experience. Here, victims are likely 
to have had recent contact with the police (during the previous year) and so it might be that 
coming into contact with the police again reminds them of their victimization experience, 
hence distorting the impact of police contact on crime risk perception. By contrast, for non-
victims the effect of “exogenous” police encounters should, in principle, not be biased by 
previous experiences involving crime and, quite likely, the police. 
The results in Table 2 support our empirical strategy. First, the estimation reported in 
column 3 shows, as expected, that the individual level of crime risk perception is not 
significant in explaining the probability of being stopped by the police for non-victims 
(and for the whole sample), yet it is significant for victims. The latter result indicates that 
the higher the level of crime risk perception of individuals that have recently been 
victimized, the greater their probability of being stopped by police officers in car controls. 
This result might reflect the fact that victims alter their behaviour towards the police, 
                                                                 
20
 Clearly, however, there are individual stereotypes that the police tend to pull over more frequently. Drivers 
of red cars, youths, and late-hour and weekend drivers are more likely to be stopped. However, while this is 
true for drug- and drink-driving tests, there are also generic police car controls for documentation that, in 
principle, may stop any citizen independently of their age, appearance or vehicle type.  
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tending, for example, to show increased levels of nervousness or anxiety that can induce 
police officers to stop them. 
 
Table 2: Probit regressions on the probability of being pulled over (Dependent variable: 
“police_stop”). 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Whole Sample Non-victims 
subsample Victims subsample 
gender -0.524*** -0.529*** -0.514*** 
 
(0.0430) (0.0479) (0.0793) 
age -0.0144*** -0.0116*** -0.0190*** 
 
(0.00114) (0.00116) (0.00232) 
crime risk perception 0.0155 -0.0237 0.0537** 
 
(0.0193) (0.0243) (0.0268) 
education 0.0879*** 0.0902*** 0.0869*** 
 
(0.0140) (0.0143) (0.0248) 
victim_property 0.360***  0.317* 
 
(0.0357)  (0.185) 
victim_person -0.0587  -0.0910 
 
(0.0980)  (0.136) 
foreign_born -0.238*** -0.229*** -0.259** 
 
(0.0668) (0.0753) (0.111) 
Constant -0.639*** -1.058*** -0.223 
 
(0.0974) (0.0912) (0.260) 
Observations 
Year fixed effects 
Neighbourhood fixed effects 
11,608 
YES 
YES 
7,270 
YES 
YES 
4,321 
YES 
YES 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In sum, the results in Table 2 demonstrate that our empirical strategy allows us to 
obtain a causal relation between police contact and crime risk perception. Our 
“police_stop” variable, which is not completely random (a driver’s age, sex, education or 
their being a foreigner influence the probability of being pulled over at a vehicle control 
point), is exogenous to the individual crime risk perception, especially for those individuals 
that have not been previously victimized. 
3.2 Controlling for Spatial Issues and Endogenous Sorting of Individuals 
A further aspect to be taken into account when working in urban settings is spatial 
dependence. Individuals do not make their choices independently; their decisions and 
perceptions are also the consequences of their social environment (including their 
neighbours, friends or ethnic groups). These peer influences have given rise in the 
literature to the theory of social interactions (Akerlof, 1997). Since our dependent variable 
measures opinions expressed by individuals, responses are likely to be influenced not just 
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by neighbourhood characteristics, but also by the characteristics of surrounding 
neighbourhoods, with the expectation that closer neighbourhoods are more likely to 
exercise an influence.  
To address this important issue we include spatial lags for the dependent variable as 
well as for “N_crime_rate”, “N_incivilities” and “N_police_perception” using a binary 
distance based matrix of 500 and 1,000 meters threshold. We consider that these variables 
will not only affect citizens’ crime risk perception in a given neighbourhood, but given the 
distance (Barcelona occupies a municipal area of 101.4 km2) and the high level of mobility 
between neighbourhoods (for reasons of work or leisure), they could also affect the crime 
risk perception of individuals in adjacent neighbourhoods. 
Finally, a possible sorting problem of individuals across neighbourhoods, i.e. people 
with higher levels of crime risk perception tending to live in areas with lower levels of 
crime or with certain specific characteristics, should not have any impact on our main 
variable of interest (“police_stop”) given its exogenous nature. However, it could have an 
impact on the estimated effect of the main neighbourhood explanatory variables. For 
instance, in the case of the “N_crime_rate” if we obtain a negative effect on crime risk 
perception, this correlation could be simply driven by the presence of unobservable factors 
and/or by an endogenous sorting of individuals into areas depending on, precisely, the 
crime rates. If this issue is not dealt with, the estimated results could be biased and, thus, 
lead to misleading conclusions. 
In order to deal with the possible sorting problem, we restrict our sample to those 
surveyed individuals who have been living in the same neighbourhood for five years (or 
more). The intuition of this empirical strategy is that these individuals would have had to 
choose where to live several years ago, taking into account the characteristics of each 
neighbourhood (victimization indexes, number of immigrants, etc.) at that time. These 
characteristics may well have changed over the years and, consequently, people may be 
sorted according to the characteristics of the past but not to the characteristics of the years 
of the study. Figure 2 presents the evolution of the victimization index for the ten districts 
of Barcelona for 1983, 1995 and 2009. It can be seen, for instance, that the aggregate 
evolution of the victimization index has changed considerably over the years, which 
supports our strategy.21 
  
                                                                 
21
 Unfortunately, we do not have neighbourhood data of the victimization index for such a long period. 
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Figure 2: Victimization index for Barcelona Districts. 
 
 
4. Empirical Results and Discussion 
Tables 3 to 7 present the results for all the approaches adopted in the present study. To 
interpret the coefficients obtained when estimating our multilevel ordered logit model, and 
given the ordering of our dependent variable, note that a negative estimated sign for a 
given variable corresponds to a decrease in the probability of being in a lower part of the 
distribution of the crime risk perception and, hence, to a negative impact of that variable on 
the individual’s crime risk perception (an increase in insecurity). 
Before explaining the results in detail, it is worth determining the percentage of the 
variance of the individual crime risk perception that is due to neighbourhood 
characteristics. The results show that approximately 6.71% of the variance in the individual 
crime risk perception is due to neighbourhood characteristics. This seems to be lower than 
results in other studies including Taylor (1997) who reported a figure of 11% and Wyant 
(2008) who reported 12%.22 Figure 3 confirms the need to account for the differences 
across neighbourhoods since several neighbourhoods are statistically different from the 
mean. 
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 However, when we use the data for just a single year, the variance is similar to that reported in these other 
studies. 
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Figure 3: Estimated residuals for the 38 Barcelona neighbourhoods. 
 
 
4.1. Police Effects on Individual Crime Risk Perception 
Table 3 presents the results for the estimation of the determinants of the individual 
crime risk perception. In relation to our main variables of interest capturing police 
proximity to citizens, the results when using the “police_call” variable (column 1) present 
the expected negative sign, indicating that direct contact with the police decreases the 
probability of individuals reporting a lower level of crime risk perception (i.e., greater 
insecurity after contact with the police). However, as pointed out above, this variable 
suffers problems of endogeneity as it is quite likely that those that are most prone to 
feelings of insecurity will present a higher propensity to contact the police. The negative 
sign obtained for this variable seems to reflect this hypothesis. 
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Table 3: Multilevel estimations for crime risk perception with “police_call” and 
“police_stop”. 
VARIABLES (1) Police_call (2) Police_stop 
α0 -12.72*** -13.09*** 
 
(1.888) (1.934) 
α1 -9.905*** -10.29*** 
 
(1.887) (1.933) 
α2 -8.221*** -8.613*** 
 
(1.886) (1.933) 
α3 -6.885*** -7.283*** 
 
(1.886) (1.932) 
Individual level variables 
  
police_call -0.403***  
 (0.0427)  
police_stop  -0.0295 
  (0.0518) 
gender 
-0.257*** -0.263*** 
 (0.0350) (0.0354) 
age 
-0.00714*** -0.00654*** 
 (0.00104) (0.00105) 
victim_property -0.721*** -0.748*** 
 (0.0383) (0.0384) 
victim_person -0.469*** -0.537*** 
 (0.0725) (0.0721) 
foreign_born 0.891*** 0.877*** 
 (0.0652) (0.0652) 
education 0.0831*** 0.0762*** 
 (0.0130) (0.0130) 
Neighbourhood level variables  
 
N_crime_rate -0.340* -0.346* 
 (0.189) (0.190) 
N_incivilities 0.606*** 0.599*** 
 (0.151) (0.155) 
N_education -0.228 -0.225 
 (0.166) (0.170) 
N_youth_male 0.0160 0.0191 
 (0.0424) (0.0435) 
N_male_immigrant 0.0735 0.0687 
 (0.0472) (0.0483) 
N_average_income 0.776* 0.812* 
 (0.439) (0.450) 
N_police_perception 0.395* 0.427* 
 (0.239) (0.245) 
N_election_partc 0.0538*** 0.0547*** 
 (0.0194) (0.0198) 
ηjk  0.0308*** 0.0334*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0113) 
Observations 11,602 11,602 
Number of groups 38 38 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The intercepts (αk) represent the log-odds of being in each 
category or lower. 
 
Column 2 in Table 3 presents the results when using the alternative variable for police 
proximity, “police_stop”, which captures the fact of being exogenously stopped by a police 
officer. Here, recall, we are confident that the estimated coefficients do not suffer the same 
bias as suffered by the “police_call” variable. The results are not statistically significant 
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when we consider the effect to be the same for victims and non-victims; however, as 
shown above, the exclusion restriction (required for our empirical strategy to work) does 
not hold for the non-victims. 
Therefore, in Table 4 we perform the estimations again, but now we distinguish 
between these two groups and we relax the proportional odds assumption, that is, up to this 
juncture we have assumed that the effect of the “police_stop” variable is the same across 
different types of respondents. However, the effect of contact with the police could differ 
across individuals depending on their crime risk perception: someone who is more fearful, 
in general, may be positively affected by contact with the police. By contrast, someone 
who does not perceive any risk of crime may not be affected by having contact with the 
police. By allowing the effect of the “police_stop” variable to vary across the intercepts we 
can capture these differences. 
The results show that coming into contact with the police is more likely to affect those 
that present a high crime risk perception and who have not been victims in the previous 
year. In general, contact with the police reduces citizens’ insecurity. As expected, for the 
subsample of victims this effect seems to be non-significant for almost all levels of crime 
risk perception, but when it is significant (for low levels of crime risk perception) it 
presents the opposite sign to that shown by non-victims; in other words, the crime risk 
perception of victims with low perception levels when being pulled over by the police 
tends to increase. As explained above, this would seem to be related to their recent 
experience with the police resulting from an earlier episode of victimization. 
To fully interpret the results, it should be stressed the fact that individuals are stopped 
by the police in controls possibly located in other neighbourhoods or outside the city. As 
such, the channel via which the fact of being pulled over affects individuals’ crime risk 
perception is likely to be psychological, since individuals are asked about their crime risk 
perception in their neighbourhood of residence. The fact that being stopped in a different 
neighbourhood affects individuals’ (non-victims) crime risk perception suggests that 
individuals do not take into account where they have been stopped. Simply coming into 
contact with police officers gives non-victims a certain degree of security in their place of 
usual residence, even though this contact might have taken place in other locations. 
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Table 4: Multilevel estimations for crime risk perception with police_stop. 
VARIABLES Non-Victims subsample Victims subsample 
α0 -12.84*** -12.01*** 
 (1.664) (2.791) 
police_stop_0 -0.302* -0.227 
 (0.156) (0.181) 
α1 -9.991*** -9.434*** 
 (1.662) (2.790) 
police_stop_1 0.132 -0.216*** 
 (0.0844) (0.0823) 
α2 -8.161*** -7.993*** 
 (1.660) (2.788) 
police_stop_2 0.481*** -0.0505 
 (0.149) (0.0889) 
α3 -6.824*** -6.649** 
 (1.660) (2.788) 
police_stop_3 0.512* -0.0773 
 (0.270) (0.130) 
Individual level variables 
  
gender 
-0.229*** -0.321*** 
 (0.0455) (0.0569) 
age 
-0.00450*** -0.0101*** 
 (0.00129) (0.00182) 
victim_property 
 -0.525*** 
 
 (0.141) 
victim_person 
 -0.443*** 
 
 (0.0949) 
foreign_born 0.991*** 0.699*** 
 (0.0866) (0.100) 
education 0.0950*** 0.0436** 
 (0.0165) (0.0216) 
Neighbourhood level variables 
 
 
N_crime_rate -1.020*** -0.146 
 (0.298) (0.224) 
N_incivilities 0.792*** 0.330 
 (0.138) (0.230) 
N_education -0.100 -0.137 
 (0.161) (0.244) 
N_youth_male 0.0265 -0.0223 
 (0.0377) (0.0628) 
N_male_immigrant 0.0869* 0.0589 
 (0.0453) (0.0711) 
N_average_income 0.791* 0.437 
 (0.418) (0.649) 
N_police_perception 0.251 0.690* 
 (0.222) (0.357) 
N_election_partc 0.0365** 0.0649** 
 (0.0181) (0.0282) 
ηjk  0.0217*** 0.0670*** 
 (0.00714) (0.0241) 
Observations 7,255 4,340 
Number of groups 38 38 
Note: see Table 3. 
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The predicted probabilities of reporting a lower category of crime risk perception 
(feelings of greater security) for someone who has been pulled over by the police are 
shown in Table 5. The overall conclusion is that non-victims who have been randomly 
stopped by police officers have a lower crime risk perception (lower insecurity), especially 
when their level of crime risk perception is high. However, there is also evidence that for 
individuals with low levels of crime risk perception random contact with the police may 
increase their perception of insecurity. 
 
Table 5: Predicted probabilities (non-victims). 
 Police_stop = 0 Police_stop = 1 
Predicted probability of reporting 
crime risk perception = 0 0.068 0.052 
Predicted probability of reporting 
crime risk perception = 1 or lower 0.557 0.589 
Predicted probability of reporting 
crime risk perception = 2 or lower 0.886 0.926 
Predicted probability of reporting 
crime risk perception = 3 or lower 0.967 0.979 
Note: All the variables have been fixed at their means or in the case of binary data at their proportions. 
 
Finally, the joint estimation of the individual level equation jointly with the 
neighbourhood intercept (both the fixed and the random part) shows, as expected, that the 
effect of being stopped by the police does not vary significantly across neighbourhoods. 
This result, indeed, reinforces the exogeneity assumption of our main independent variable. 
4.2. Individual and Neighbourhood Determinants of Insecurity 
Note that the obtained results for the individual and the neighbourhood variables are 
very similar in Table 3 and Table 4 (and across the various columns presented). More 
precisely, the approximation to the physical and social vulnerability of individuals’ “age” 
and “gender” present a negative and statistically significant coefficient, implying that the 
elderly and women have a higher crime risk perception: more specifically, women 
(“gender” = 1) and the elderly are more likely to be in a higher category of crime risk 
perception. Moreover, the variables reflecting prior victimization against the person 
“victim_person” and against property “victim_property” reflect a negative estimate sign 
meaning that people who have suffered recent prior victimization (in the preceding year) 
are more likely to report a higher crime risk perception. Here our results are in line with 
those reported previously in the literature (see, for instance, Quann and Hung, 2002). 
Being a victim of a property crime has a greater effect on an individual’s crime risk 
perception than being the victim of a crime against the person. This result is somewhat 
unexpected as we expected those who had directly suffered a crime against the person (for 
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instance, an assault) to be more likely to feel insecure. However, the results seem to be 
driven by the fact that the majority of property crimes suffered in Barcelona involve 
muggings or larceny, which differ from a burglary where the victims tend not to see the 
criminals. 
The results for the “foreign_born” variable present a positive sign, indicating that 
immigrants’ crime risk perception is lower than that of residents. This result may be 
explained by the fact that foreign-born individuals (especially from developing countries) 
are used to (even worse) criminal environments in their countries of origin and, therefore, 
in relative terms, living in Barcelona might be perceived as being safer for them. This 
result contradicts findings reported by Skogan and Maxfield (1981) who found that racial 
and ethnic minorities tend to be more fearful. This difference might be due to the fact that 
in our study the racial issue is not explicitly taken into account (as we control for country 
of origin rather than race). 
The “education” variable presents a positive and significant sign indicating that more 
educated people have a higher probability of being among the lower values of the crime 
risk perception variable, that is, less perception of insecurity. This seems to show that the 
social interactions of more highly educated citizens decrease their crime risk perception. 
Additionally, more educated people tend to be better informed and, consequently, 
understand the reality of their neighbourhoods more accurately. 
As for the neighbourhood determinants of crime risk perception, our results seem to 
indicate that two of the variables are statistically significant, while the rest generally 
present the expected sign. Several results draw our attention. First, “N_incivilities” shows a 
positive estimated coefficient with crime risk perception,23 indicating that the higher the 
citizens’ assessment of incivilities in the neighbourhood, the lower the probability of their 
reporting a lower level of crime risk perception; or, in quantitative terms, on average, a 
one-point increase in the assessment of incivilities in the neighbourhood increases the 
probability of being in a higher category of the crime risk perception distribution by 0.60 
(from results in Table 3). This effect is strongly significant serving to demonstrate that 
“fear in the urban environment is above all a fear of social disorder” (Hunter, 1978) and 
lending support to the “broken window” theory. Second, as expected, the “N_crime_rate” 
variable has a positive effect on crime risk perception. Thus, citizens living in 
neighbourhoods with higher crime rates are less likely to report a lower category of crime 
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 Recall that “N_incivilities” ranges between 0 (many incivilities perceived) and 10 (no incivilities 
perceived). 
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risk perception (greater insecurity). Third, the variable capturing each neighbourhood’s 
social capital, approximated by “N_election_partc”, also presents a positive and significant 
effect on crime risk perception. This suggests that the higher the political participation (i.e., 
a proxy of the levels of trust and civic involvement in community decision making) the 
higher the probability of citizens’ reporting a lower level of crime risk perception. 
4.3 Robustness Checks 
Spatial patterns 
Table 6 presents the results for the multilevel ordered logit model when taking into 
account the spatial effects of some of the variables of interest. The prefix W reflects the 
spatial lag of the variable that follows it. The two columns present different matrix 
definitions. When using binary distance based matrix of 500 metres threshold (first 
column) the results show positive and significant impact of all variables from neighbouring 
areas on individual crime risk perception (the weakest result is obtained for 
W_police_perception). 
 
Table 6: Estimations for crime risk perception with spatial lags (whole sample). 
 W= Binary distance based matrix 
of 500m threshold 
W= Binary distance based matrix of 
1,000 m threshold. 
W_crime_risk_perception 0.0442** 0.0295* 
 (0.0215) (0.0151) 
W_incivilities 0.0136** 0.0101** 
 (0.00692) (0.00495) 
W_police_perception 0.0120* 0.00959* 
 (0.00674) (0.00502) 
W_crime_rate 0.293*** 0.134* 
 (0.113) (0.0702) 
Individual variables YES YES 
Neighbourhood variables YES YES 
Observations 11,605 11,605 
Number of groups 38 38 
Note: Robust Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The individual and 
neighbourhood variables present the same sign and statistical significance as those reported in previous 
tables. 
 
Column 2 of Table 6 uses a binary distance based matrix of 1,000 metres threshold 
showing consistent results, although with lower statistical significance as expected. The 
results show that, first, the higher the crime risk perception in contiguous neighbourhoods 
(greater insecurity), the higher the probability of a lower crime risk perception (greater 
security) being reported. Second, the perception of a greater number of incivilities in other 
neighbourhoods increases the level of crime risk perception (greater insecurity). This is 
logical if we realise that incivilities are directly perceived by individuals (unlike a 
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neighbourhood’s crime rate or a neighbourhood’s crime risk perception), given that they 
can take the form of broken windows, dirty streets or abandoned cars in the street. Third, 
the spatial lag of “N_police_perception” shows the expected positive sign indicating that 
the higher the valuation of police forces in contiguous neighbourhoods, the greater the 
probability of a lower category of crime risk perception being reported. Fourth, the higher 
the crime rate in the contiguous neighbourhoods, the greater the probability of a lower 
level of crime risk perception (more security) being reported. This result can be explained 
by the fact that individual perceptions are expressed in relative terms. Thus, if individuals 
know that crime rates are higher in other neighbourhoods, they may think that their own 
neighbourhood is more secure. 
Endogenous sorting 
Table 7 presents the results for the restricted sample constructed to avoid possible 
problems of sorting of individuals into certain neighbourhoods. The sample comprises 
those citizens living in the same place for five years or more. Note that there are fewer 
observations in this sample because the question regarding length of residence was posed 
to just 50% of the individuals surveyed. Having fewer observations reduces the power of 
our estimations; however, we performed these estimations as it is the only way to deal with 
the potential endogeneity arising from the neighbourhood variables and the sorting of 
individuals in these neighbourhoods. Consequently, these results should be interpreted with 
some caution given that the individual observations may not be fully representative at the 
neighbourhood level and, as before, we further distinguish individuals between victims and 
non-victims. 
Interestingly, our main variable of interest, “police_stop”, presents the same effect as 
before. Citizens that have not recently suffered victimization and who present a high crime 
risk perception are positively affected (reduced crime risk perception) by the fact of their 
having been stopped by the police. Likewise, at the individual level, the variables seem to 
present the same signs with the exception of “age” which is no longer significant. Indeed, 
the individual variables should not change (sign and significance), since by restricting the 
sample only the neighbourhood variables should be affected. However, the minor 
variations in the results for the individual variables may, we believe, be driven by the 
reduction in the number of observations in the demanding multilevel estimations. 
In the case of neighbourhood variables, when using the whole restricted sample, the 
neighbourhood crime rate index still does not affect citizens’ crime risk perception, 
although it does present the expected sign. However, when using the non-victims 
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subsample, the effect is similar to that described above. Moreover, note that incivilities are 
still positive and significant at the 1% level. We obtain the same result for the variable 
capturing the average assessment of the police but our proxy for the level of social capital 
(“N_election_part”) is no longer significant. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This study has analyzed the main individual and neighbourhood determinants of crime 
risk perception paying particular attention to the role of police proximity in the level of 
insecurity expressed by citizens. In order to account for the hierarchical structure of the 
data (at both individual and neighbourhood levels) and given the ordering of our dependent 
variable capturing an individual’s crime risk perception, we used an ordered multilevel 
logit model. This model has enabled us to account for the differences both within and 
across neighbourhoods and to obtain robust estimations.  
The results show that individual characteristics such as being old, being a woman, 
being a native resident, having suffered victimization and being poorly educated increase 
the reported level of crime risk perception. In the case of neighbourhood characteristics, 
the level of perceived incivilities and the level of social capital (measured by means of 
voter turnout) seem to affect crime risk perception in the expected way – that is, the lower 
the assessment of the neighbourhood (i.e. the greater the number of incivilities), the higher 
the level of crime risk perception. In the same line, increased voter turnout as a measure of 
social capital seems to reduce the level of crime risk perception. Both variables, together 
with the assessment of police institutions, are spatially correlated with the level of crime 
risk perception. This means that crime risk perception is not only affected by the level of 
social capital, the number of incivilities and the citizens’ assessment of the police in a 
given neighbourhood, but also by the levels of these variables in the contiguous 
neighbourhoods. 
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Table 7: Multilevel estimations for crime risk perception with restricted sample (living in 
same place for five years or more). 
VARIABLES (1) Restricted sample (2) Non-victims (3) Victims 
α0 -14.58*** -13.25*** -16.16*** 
 (2.107) (2.607) (3.568) 
police_stop_0 -0.251 -0.277 -0.537 
 (0.211) (0.261) (0.334) 
α1 -11.72*** -10.44*** -13.60*** 
 (2.104) (2.604) (3.562) 
police_stop_1 -0.0810 0.131 -0.232* 
 (0.0957) (0.131) (0.138) 
α2 -10.07*** -8.695*** -12.16*** 
 (2.101) (2.601) (3.559) 
police_stop_2 0.123 0.469** 0.130 
 (0.120) (0.212) (0.151) 
α3 -8.640*** -7.528*** -10.57*** 
 (2.101) (2.601) (3.556) 
police_stop_3 0.0276 0.774** -0.126 
 (0.187) (0.390) (0.223) 
Individual level variables    
gender -0.204*** -0.214*** -0.218** 
 (0.0594) (0.0702) (0.0971) 
age -0.00387** -0.000750 -0.00573* 
 (0.00171) (0.00194) (0.00301) 
victim_property -0.675***  -0.476** 
 (0.0642)  (0.238) 
victim_person -0.559***  -0.367** 
 (0.120)  (0.168) 
foreign_born 0.733*** 0.677*** 0.935*** 
 (0.144) (0.174) (0.218) 
education 0.0769*** 0.115*** 0.00533 
 (0.0215) (0.0249) (0.0359) 
Neighbourhood level variables    
N_crime_rate -0.552* -1.095** -0.529 
 (0.290) (0.476) (0.367) 
N_incivilities 0.752*** 0.806*** 0.570* 
 (0.186) (0.222) (0.324) 
N_education -0.0447 -0.0511 0.428 
 (0.210) (0.260) (0.381) 
N_youth_male -0.0228 0.00305 -0.0400 
 (0.0498) (0.0594) (0.0865) 
N_male_immigrant 0.117** 0.106 0.0475 
 (0.0595) (0.0720) (0.105) 
N_average_income 0.545 0.286 0.611 
 (0.534) (0.678) (0.904) 
N_police_perception 0.717** 0.576 1.161** 
 (0.298) (0.353) (0.528) 
N_election_partc 0.0376 0.0300 0.0179 
 (0.0241) (0.0296) (0.0433) 
ηjk 0.0229* 0.0341* 0.0935** 
 (0.0130) (0.0186) (0.0427) 
Observations 4,153 3,040 1,113 
Number of groups 38 38 38 
Note: see Table 3. 
We have tackled the potential issue of individual sorting across neighbourhoods by 
using a subsample consisting of those individuals that had lived for more than five years in 
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the neighbourhood. The results seem to be unchanged for the majority of the variables 
used, confirming the results obtained. 
As for our main variable of interest, i.e., police proximity (having first controlled for 
the potential endogeneity derived from the fact that individuals with higher crime risk 
perception are more prone to contact the police), we found the simple fact of being 
exogenously stopped by a police officer to be a signal of police proximity that lowers the 
level of crime risk perception, albeit only for those individuals that had not recently 
suffered victimization. This result differs across different levels of crime risk perception. 
More insecure individuals (those reporting higher levels of crime risk perception) are more 
positively affected by contact with the police. Indeed, we find no evidence that contact 
with the police affects the level of crime risk perception (insecurity) in the case of those 
non-victims that present the lowest level of crime risk perception (fearless). 
In the case of citizens that have suffered prior episodes of victimization, we find some 
evidence of their being negatively affected by contact with the police (feelings of greater 
insecurity). It might be that victims, when coming into contact with the police again, are 
reminded of their previous victimization experience and, hence, feel more insecure. 
These results have a number of important policy implications especially as regards 
security, since they serve to reinforce the call for the police to play a greater socializing 
role – in other words, patrolling the streets preventing crime should not be the sole role of 
community police officers. Stopping citizens and interacting with them can have an 
important impact on levels of security, making citizens feel safer. It could therefore be 
interesting if police officers were to enhance their socializing skills so as to learn how to 
get closer to citizens and to handle situations with the aim of making people feel safer.  
Finally, the socializing role of police forces should be taken into account when 
estimating their output since the sole consideration of crime clear-up rates could be 
misleading. Public expenditure on policing should be seen as an investment in deterring 
crime as well as an investment in individual, and overall, well-being since, as we have 
shown in this study, individual benefits can be gained from police proximity. 
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Appendix A (Multilevel Ordered Logit Model) 
 
In order to explain the main individual and neighbourhood determinants of 
individual crime risk perception and the impact of police proximity on this perception, 
and as we measure crime risk perception on a scale from 0 (no crime risk perception at 
all) to 4 (maximum level of crime risk perception) as our dependent variable, we need to 
use a link function. This link function may be either logit or probit; however, here, for 
simplicity’s sake, we opt for the logit function.24 The dependent variable can take up to 
five values and, hence, the probability of each response is denoted by:  
kπky == )Pr(  where 1
4
1
=∑
=k
kpi  for k = 0,1,2....4   (A.1) 
where y represents our dependent variable (crime risk perception) and πk is the 
probability of response k. As the data is ordered, we can define the cumulative response 
probabilities that reflect the ordering of the values of y. We define γk the cumulative 
probability of being in category k or lower as: 
kk ky pipipiγ +++=≤= ...)Pr( 21 .    (A.2) 
Suppose we have m control variables, then the cumulative logit model (or ordered 
logit model) for individual i is defined as: 
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where αk refers to a threshold parameter or intercept in each category of the dependent 
variable. As individuals are clustered into neighbourhoods (denoted by j), they may 
follow a certain distribution within each neighbourhood, which needs to be taken into 
account by using a multilevel approach. The use of multilevel models is justified mainly 
on statistical grounds. If observations are clustered into categories and ordinary least 
squares (OLS) is used, the estimations will be unbiased but inefficient since the 
variances of errors could be underestimated leading to incorrect inferences. A potential 
way of dealing with clustered data would be to introduce dummy variables that account 
for the cluster specific effect. However, it is not possible to observe cluster specific 
errors or the effects due to observed and unobserved group characteristics. In a 
multilevel (random effects) model, the effects of both types of variables can be 
estimated separately and the residual variance is partitioned into a between-group 
component (variability across groups) and within-group component (variability across 
                                                                 
24
 The two functions are similar and the results do not vary considerably when using the probit model. In 
the case of the logit specification taking exponentials of the estimated coefficients gives the odd ratios 
and they are, therefore, easily interpretable. 
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individuals). Therefore, estimations will have the correct standard errors as well as 
providing estimates of the between-group and within-group variances. 
The estimation is performed by maximum likelihood (ML), implying some OLS 
starting values are given and, then, adopting an iterative procedure, the likelihood 
function converges to the efficient, unbiased values. If both the coefficients and the 
random effects are included in the likelihood function, we use a full maximum 
likelihood (FML) procedure. Alternatively, if only the random effects are included, we 
use a restricted maximum likelihood (RML) procedure. The former presents certain 
advantages over RML, including the fact that it provides for easier computations as well 
as the possibility of testing differences between two nested models that differ only in the 
fixed part. Here we present the general multilevel logit ordered model to be estimated: 
∑++==
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jmmmj εγβ +=      (B.6) 
The above model presents three equations. Eq. (A.4) represents level 1 or the individual 
level with threshold parameters of the single level logit model. However, this model 
differs from Eq. (A.3) in two respects. First, β0jk is the intercept (see Eq. A.5) and 
represents level 2, which varies across neighbourhoods and comprises a fixed part 
∑+
l
ljmlkk Zβγ 0  where the latter are the l explanatory variables of neighbourhood j, and 
a random part )N(0,~ u02ση jk . Second, Eq. (A.6) is the random and fixed part for the 
coefficient m of neighbourhood j. It also comprises the fixed part γm, and the random 
part )N(0,~ um2σε jm . The coefficients present the subscript k because the impact of the 
random intercept or the variables may be different for the four categories of crime risk 
perception (proportional odds assumption). We test if this assumption holds by means 
of a Wald test.  
Since we are using an ordered multilevel logit model the coefficients are interpreted 
as the effect of a 1-unit change in the independent variable on the log-odds of being in a 
lower category of the dependent variable as opposed to being in a higher category 
(Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008). Taking exponentials of each estimated coefficient 
yields the multiplicative effect of a 1-unit increase in the independent variable on the 
odds of being in a lower category of crime risk perception holding constant the group 
effect. Alternatively, if we apply exp(β+αk)/[1+exp(β+αk)] to the coefficients, we would 
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obtain the predicted probabilities. As for the cut-offs or interceptions, each αk (if taking 
exponentials) represents the predicted probability of being in category “k” or lower 
(holding constant the group effect) and, because of the ordering of the dependent 
variable, it increases with the response variable. 
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Appendix B (Ordered logit estimates) 
 
Table 8: Ordered logit estimation for crime risk perception. 
 Non-Victims subsample Victims subsample 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
α0 6.881*** 8.130*** 
 (1.356) (1.894) 
police_stop_0 0.331** 0.245 
 (0.152) (0.279) 
α1 4.008*** 5.530*** 
 (1.358) (1.863) 
police_stop_1 -0.106 0.210** 
 (0.0741) (0.104) 
α2 4.008*** 4.068** 
 (1.358) (1.860) 
police_stop_2 -0.430*** 0.0244 
 (0.154) (0.104) 
α3 0.240 1.924 
 (1.351) (1.878) 
police_stop_3 -0.565* 0.0847 
 (0.315) (0.265) 
Individual level variables 
  
gender 0.236*** 0.317** 
 (0.0483) (0.125) 
age 0.00468** 0.0104*** 
 (0.00229) (0.00376) 
victim_property 
 
0.588** 
 
 
(0.240) 
victim_person 
 
0.462*** 
 
 
(0.160) 
foreign_born -0.990*** -0.763*** 
 (0.134) (0.176) 
education -0.0959*** -0.0516 
 (0.0269) (0.0409) 
Neighbourhood level variables 
  
N_crime_rate 0.907*** 0.173 
 (0.343) (0.321) 
N_incivilities -0.370*** 0.0134 
 (0.136) (0.0346) 
N_youth_male -0.0152** 0.00342 
 (0.00726) (0.00907) 
N_male_immigrant -0.0529** -0.613*** 
 (0.0209) (0.157) 
N_average_income -0.0427 0.440 
 (0.241) (0.507) 
N_police_perception -0.158 -0.0765 
 (0.127) (0.198) 
N_election_partc -0.0147 -0.0755*** 
 (0.0257) (0.0225) 
Observations 7,270 4,341 
Time fixed effects YES YES 
Neighbourhood fixed effects YES YES 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at neighbourhood level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. N_education has 
been automatically dropped since its inclusion causes a collinearity problem. 
34
  
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2011 
 
2011/1, Oppedisano, V; Turati, G.: "What are the causes of educational inequalities and of their evolution over time 
in Europe? Evidence from PISA" 
2011/2, Dahlberg, M; Edmark, K; Lundqvist, H.: "Ethnic diversity and preferences for redistribution " 
2011/3, Canova, L.; Vaglio, A.: "Why do educated mothers matter? A model of parental help” 
2011/4, Delgado, F.J.; Lago-Peñas, S.; Mayor, M.: “On the determinants of local tax rates: new evidence from 
Spain” 
2011/5, Piolatto, A.; Schuett, F.: “A model of music piracy with popularity-dependent copying costs” 
2011/6, Duch, N.; García-Estévez, J.; Parellada, M.: “Universities and regional economic growth in Spanish 
regions” 
2011/7, Duch, N.; García-Estévez, J.: “Do universities affect firms’ location decisions? Evidence from Spain” 
2011/8, Dahlberg, M.; Mörk, E.: “Is there an election cycle in public employment? Separating time effects from 
election year effects” 
2011/9, Costas-Pérez, E.; Solé-Ollé, A.; Sorribas-Navarro, P.: “Corruption scandals, press reporting, and 
accountability. Evidence from Spanish mayors” 
2011/10, Choi, A.; Calero, J.; Escardíbul, J.O.: “Hell to touch the sky? private tutoring and academic achievement 
in Korea” 
2011/11, Mira Godinho, M.; Cartaxo, R.: “University patenting, licensing and technology transfer: how 
organizational context and available resources determine performance” 
2011/12, Duch-Brown, N.; García-Quevedo, J.; Montolio, D.: “The link between public support and private R&D 
effort: What is the optimal subsidy?” 
2011/13, Breuillé, M.L.; Duran-Vigneron, P.; Samson, A.L.: “To assemble to resemble? A study of tax disparities 
among French municipalities” 
2011/14, McCann, P.; Ortega-Argilés, R.: “Smart specialisation, regional growth and applications to EU cohesion 
policy” 
2011/15, Montolio, D.; Trillas, F.: “Regulatory federalism and industrial policy in broadband telecommunications” 
2011/16, Pelegrín, A.; Bolancé, C.: “Offshoring and company characteristics: some evidence from the analysis of 
Spanish firm data” 
2011/17, Lin, C.: “Give me your wired and your highly skilled: measuring the impact of immigration policy on 
employers and shareholders”  
2011/18, Bianchini, L.; Revelli, F.: “Green polities: urban environmental performance and government popularity” 
2011/19, López Real, J.: “Family reunification or point-based immigration system? The case of the U.S. and 
Mexico” 
2011/20, Bogliacino, F.; Piva, M.; Vivarelli, M.: “The impact of R&D on employment in Europe: a firm-level 
analysis” 
2011/21, Tonello, M.: “Mechanisms of peer interactions between native and non-native students: rejection or 
integration?” 
2011/22, García-Quevedo, J.; Mas-Verdú, F.; Montolio, D.: “What type of innovative firms acquire knowledge 
intensive services and from which suppliers?” 
2011/23, Banal-Estañol, A.; Macho-Stadler, I.; Pérez-Castrillo, D.: “Research output from university-industry 
collaborative projects” 
2011/24, Ligthart, J.E.; Van Oudheusden, P.: “In government we trust: the role of fiscal decentralization” 
2011/25, Mongrain, S.; Wilson, J.D.: “Tax competition with heterogeneous capital mobility” 
2011/26, Caruso, R.; Costa, J.; Ricciuti, R.: “The probability of military rule in Africa, 1970-2007” 
2011/27, Solé-Ollé, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Local spending and the housing boom” 
2011/28, Simón, H.; Ramos, R.; Sanromá, E.: “Occupational mobility of immigrants in a low skilled economy. The 
Spanish case” 
2011/29, Piolatto, A.; Trotin, G.: “Optimal tax enforcement under prospect theory” 
2011/30, Montolio, D; Piolatto, A.: “Financing public education when altruistic agents have retirement concerns” 
2011/31, García-Quevedo, J.; Pellegrino, G.; Vivarelli, M.: “The determinants of YICs’ R&D activity” 
2011/32, Goodspeed, T.J.: “Corruption, accountability, and decentralization: theory and evidence from Mexico” 
2011/33, Pedraja, F.; Cordero, J.M.: “Analysis of alternative proposals to reform the Spanish intergovernmental 
transfer system for municipalities” 
2011/34, Jofre-Monseny, J.; Sorribas-Navarro, P.; Vázquez-Grenno, J.: “Welfare spending and ethnic 
heterogeneity: evidence from a massive immigration wave” 
2011/35, Lyytikäinen, T.: “Tax competition among local governments: evidence from a property tax reform in 
Finland” 
2011/36, Brülhart, M.; Schmidheiny, K.: “Estimating the Rivalness of State-Level Inward FDI” 
2011/37, García-Pérez, J.I.; Hidalgo-Hidalgo, M.; Robles-Zurita, J.A.: “Does grade retention affect achievement? 
Some evidence from Pisa” 
2011/38, Boffa, f.; Panzar. J.: “Bottleneck co-ownership as a regulatory alternative” 
  
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2011/39, González-Val, R.; Olmo, J.: “Growth in a cross-section of cities: location, increasing returns or random 
growth?” 
2011/40, Anesi, V.; De Donder, P.: “Voting under the threat of secession: accommodation vs. repression” 
2011/41, Di Pietro, G.; Mora, T.: “The effect of the l’Aquila earthquake on labour market outcomes” 
2011/42, Brueckner, J.K.; Neumark, D.: “Beaches, sunshine, and public-sector pay: theory and evidence on 
amenities and rent extraction by government workers” 
2011/43, Cortés, D.: “Decentralization of government and contracting with the private sector” 
2011/44, Turati, G.; Montolio, D.; Piacenza, M.: “Fiscal decentralisation, private school funding, and students’ 
achievements. A tale from two Roman catholic countries” 
 
 
2012 
 
2012/1, Montolio, D.; Trujillo, E.: "What drives investment in telecommunications? The role of regulation, firms’ 
internationalization and market knowledge" 
2012/2, Giesen, K.; Suedekum, J.: "The size distribution across all “cities”: a unifying approach" 
2012/3, Foremny, D.; Riedel, N.: "Business taxes and the electoral cycle" 
2012/4, García-Estévez, J.; Duch-Brown, N.: "Student graduation: to what extent does university expenditure 
matter?" 
2012/5, Durán-Cabré, J.M.; Esteller-Moré, A.; Salvadori, L.: "Empirical evidence on horizontal competition in 
tax enforcement" 
2012/6, Pickering, A.C.; Rockey, J.: "Ideology and the growth of US state government" 
2012/7, Vergolini, L.; Zanini, N.: "How does aid matter? The effect of financial aid on university enrolment 
decisions" 
2012/8, Backus, P.: "Gibrat’s law and legacy for non-profit organisations: a non-parametric analysis" 
2012/9, Jofre-Monseny, J.; Marín-López, R.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "What underlies localization and 
urbanization economies? Evidence from the location of new firms" 
2012/10, Mantovani, A.; Vandekerckhove, J.: "The strategic interplay between bundling and merging in 
complementary markets" 
2012/11, Garcia-López, M.A.: "Urban spatial structure, suburbanization and transportation in Barcelona" 
2012/12, Revelli, F.: "Business taxation and economic performance in hierarchical government structures" 
2012/13, Arqué-Castells, P.; Mohnen, P.: "Sunk costs, extensive R&D subsidies and permanent inducement 
effects" 
2012/14, Boffa, F.; Piolatto, A.; Ponzetto, G.: "Centralization and accountability: theory and evidence from the 
Clean Air Act" 
2012/15, Cheshire, P.C.; Hilber, C.A.L.; Kaplanis, I.: "Land use regulation and productivity – land matters: 
evidence from a UK supermarket chain" 
2012/16, Choi, A.; Calero, J.: "The contribution of the disabled to the attainment of the Europe 2020 strategy 
headline targets" 
2012/17, Silva, J.I.; Vázquez-Grenno, J.: "The ins and outs of unemployment in a two-tier labor market" 
2012/18, González-Val, R.; Lanaspa, L.; Sanz, F.: "New evidence on Gibrat’s law for cities" 
2012/19, Vázquez-Grenno, J.: "Job search methods in times of crisis: native and immigrant strategies in Spain" 
2012/20, Lessmann, C.: "Regional inequality and decentralization – an empirical analysis" 
2012/21, Nuevo-Chiquero, A.: "Trends in shotgun marriages: the pill, the will or the cost?" 
2012/22, Piil Damm, A.: "Neighborhood quality and labor market outcomes: evidence from quasi-random 
neighborhood assignment of immigrants" 
2012/23, Ploeckl, F.: "Space, settlements, towns: the influence of geography and market access on settlement 
distribution and urbanization" 
2012/24, Algan, Y.; Hémet, C.; Laitin, D.: "Diversity and local public goods: a natural experiment with exogenous 
residential allocation" 
2012/25, Martinez, D.; Sjögren, T.: "Vertical externalities with lump-sum taxes: how much difference does 
unemployment make?" 
2012/26, Cubel, M.; Sanchez-Pages, S.: "The effect of within-group inequality in a conflict against a unitary threat" 
2012/27, Andini, M.; De Blasio, G.; Duranton, G.; Strange, W.C.: "Marshallian labor market pooling: evidence 
from Italy" 
2012/28, Solé-Ollé, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Do political parties matter for local land use policies?" 
2012/29, Buonanno, P.; Durante, R.; Prarolo, G.; Vanin, P.: "Poor institutions, rich mines: resource curse and the 
origins of the Sicilian mafia" 
2012/30, Anghel, B.; Cabrales, A.; Carro, J.M.: "Evaluating a bilingual education program in Spain: the impact 
beyond foreign language learning" 
2012/31, Curto-Grau, M.; Solé-Ollé, A.; Sorribas-Navarro, P.: "Partisan targeting of inter-governmental transfers 
& state interference in local elections: evidence from Spain" 
  
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2012/32, Kappeler, A.; Solé-Ollé, A.; Stephan, A.; Välilä, T.: "Does fiscal decentralization foster regional 
investment in productive infrastructure?" 
2012/33, Rizzo, L.; Zanardi, A.: "Single vs double ballot and party coalitions: the impact on fiscal policy. Evidence 
from Italy" 
2012/34, Ramachandran, R.: "Language use in education and primary schooling attainment: evidence from a 
natural experiment in Ethiopia" 
2012/35, Rothstein, J.: "Teacher quality policy when supply matters" 
2012/36, Ahlfeldt, G.M.: "The hidden dimensions of urbanity" 
2012/37, Mora, T.; Gil, J.; Sicras-Mainar, A.: "The influence of BMI, obesity and overweight on medical costs: a 
panel data approach" 
2012/38, Pelegrín, A.; García-Quevedo, J.: "Which firms are involved in foreign vertical integration?" 
2012/39, Agasisti, T.; Longobardi, S.: "Inequality in education: can Italian disadvantaged students close the gap? A 
focus on resilience in the Italian school system" 
 
 
2013 
 
2013/1, Sánchez-Vidal, M.; González-Val, R.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Sequential city growth in the US: does age 
matter?" 
2013/2, Hortas Rico, M.: "Sprawl, blight and the role of urban containment policies. Evidence from US cities" 
2013/3, Lampón, J.F.; Cabanelas-Lorenzo, P-; Lago-Peñas, S.: "Why firms relocate their production overseas? 
The answer lies inside: corporate, logistic and technological determinants" 
2013/4, Montolio, D.; Planells, S.: "Does tourism boost criminal activity? Evidence from a top touristic country" 
2013/5, Garcia-López, M.A.; Holl, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Suburbanization and highways: when the Romans, 
the Bourbons and the first cars still shape Spanish cities" 
2013/6, Bosch, N.; Espasa, M.; Montolio, D.: "Should large Spanish municipalities be financially compensated? 
Costs and benefits of being a capital/central municipality" 
2013/7, Escardíbul, J.O.; Mora, T.: "Teacher gender and student performance in mathematics. Evidence from 
Catalonia" 
2013/8, Arqué-Castells, P.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Banking towards development: evidence from the Spanish 
banking expansion plan" 
2013/9, Asensio, J.; Gómez-Lobo, A.; Matas, A.: "How effective are policies to reduce gasoline consumption? 
Evaluating a quasi-natural experiment in Spain" 
2013/10, Jofre-Monseny, J.: "The effects of unemployment benefits on migration in lagging regions" 
2013/11, Segarra, A.; García-Quevedo, J.; Teruel, M.: "Financial constraints and the failure of innovation 
projects" 
2013/12, Jerrim, J.; Choi, A.: "The mathematics skills of school children: How does England compare to the high 
performing East Asian jurisdictions?" 
2013/13, González-Val, R.; Tirado-Fabregat, D.A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Market potential and city growth: 
Spain 1860-1960" 
2013/14, Lundqvist, H.: "Is it worth it? On the returns to holding political office" 
2013/15, Ahlfeldt, G.M.; Maennig, W.: "Homevoters vs. leasevoters: a spatial analysis of airport effects" 
2013/16, Lampón, J.F.; Lago-Peñas, S.: "Factors behind international relocation and changes in production 
geography in the European automobile components industry" 
2013/17, Guío, J.M.; Choi, A.: "Evolution of the school failure risk during the 2000 decade in Spain: analysis of 
Pisa results with a two-level logistic mode" 
2013/18, Dahlby, B.; Rodden, J.: "A political economy model of the vertical fiscal gap and vertical fiscal 
imbalances in a federation" 
2013/19, Acacia, F.; Cubel, M.: "Strategic voting and happiness" 
2013/20, Hellerstein, J.K.; Kutzbach, M.J.; Neumark, D.: "Do labor market networks have an important spatial 
dimension?" 
2013/21, Pellegrino, G.; Savona, M.: "Is money all? Financing versus knowledge and demand constraints to 
innovation" 
2013/22, Lin, J.: "Regional resilience" 
2013/23, Costa-Campi, M.T.; Duch-Brown, N.; García-Quevedo, J.: "R&D drivers and obstacles to innovation in 
the energy industry" 
2013/24, Huisman, R.; Stradnic, V.; Westgaard, S.: "Renewable energy and electricity prices: indirect empirical 
evidence from hydro power" 
2013/25, Dargaud, E.; Mantovani, A.; Reggiani, C.: "The fight against cartels: a transatlantic perspective" 
2013/26, Lambertini, L.; Mantovani, A.: "Feedback equilibria in a dynamic renewable resource oligopoly: pre-
emption, voracity and exhaustion" 
  
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2013/27, Feld, L.P.; Kalb, A.; Moessinger, M.D.; Osterloh, S.: "Sovereign bond market reactions to fiscal rules 
and no-bailout clauses – the Swiss experience" 
2013/28, Hilber, C.A.L.; Vermeulen, W.: "The impact of supply constraints on house prices in England" 
2013/29, Revelli, F.: "Tax limits and local democracy" 
2013/30, Wang, R.; Wang, W.: "Dress-up contest: a dark side of fiscal decentralization" 
2013/31, Dargaud, E.; Mantovani, A.; Reggiani, C.: "The fight against cartels: a transatlantic perspective" 
2013/32, Saarimaa, T.; Tukiainen, J.: "Local representation and strategic voting: evidence from electoral boundary 
reforms" 
2013/33, Agasisti, T.; Murtinu, S.: "Are we wasting public money? No! The effects of grants on Italian university 
students’ performances" 
2013/34, Flacher, D.; Harari-Kermadec, H.; Moulin, L.: "Financing higher education: a contributory scheme" 
2013/35, Carozzi, F.; Repetto, L.: "Sending the pork home: birth town bias in transfers to Italian municipalities" 
2013/36, Coad, A.; Frankish, J.S.; Roberts, R.G.; Storey, D.J.: "New venture survival and growth: Does the fog 
lift?" 
2013/37, Giulietti, M.; Grossi, L.; Waterson, M.: "Revenues from storage in a competitive electricity market: 
Empirical evidence from Great Britain" 
 

